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ABS TRACT
Fluctuations of business activity in the United States clearly
havetheir monetary and financial side, but these aspects of U.S.
economic fluctuations exhibit few quantitative regularities that have
persisted unchanged across spans of tine over which the nation's financial
marketshave themselves undergone significant change.
The evidence on monetary and financial aspects of U.S. business
cycles assembled in this paper shows major differences among the pre World
War I, inter—war, and post World War II periods, and between the first and
second halves of the post—war period. Evidence suggesting changes from
one period to another repeatedly emerges, regardless of whether the method
of analysis is simple or sophisticated, regardless of whether the underlying
data are annual or quarterly, and regardless of whether the relationships
under study are bivariate or multivariate. Moreover, the differences
between one period and another are significant not just statistically but
also economically, in the sense of major differences in the magnitude and
timing of cyclical movements.
The paper's main message, therefore, is a warning against accepting
too readily —eitheras a matter of positive economics or for policy
purposes —theappearance of simple and eternal verities in much of the
existingliterature of monetary and financial aspects of business fluctuations.
?brecomplicatedmodels involving many variables and/or nonlinear
relationshipsmay have remained stable, but the evidence clearly shows
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The monetary and financial aspects of fluctuations in economic
activity have attracted the attention of economists and other observers
of the business cycle for a long time. Throughout the nineteenth century
and into the early years of the twentieth, business downturns in the
United States were typically associated in a quite obvious way with
9panics'or other sharp discontinuities in the financial markets. Such
readily visible events have all but vanished since the establishment of
theFederal Reserve System in 1914 and especially the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation in 1934, but the pace of activity in the financial
marketshas continued to vary closely with that in many of the economy's
nonfinancial markets. Much of this covariation is by now highly familiar,
if not necessarily well understood. The regularities on which macroeconomists
havefocused most intensively in this context are those involving money
(including either high-powered money or deposit money), credit (including
public debt, private debt, or the sum of the two), and interest rates.1
In large part because of the availability of data extending back to the
earlyyears of this century, and in some cases still earlier, the documentation
of these regularities over fairly long time periods is now broadly familiar.
Onefactor motivating the long history of interest in this subject
is, of course, simply the desire to understand more fully the underlying
causes and internal dynamics of business fluctuations. Implications for
public policy have also been important in this regard, however. A common
thread running through decades of literature on the monetary and financial
aspects of business cycles has been the actual or potential role of monetary—2--
policy in affecting either real economic outcomes or price stability,
or both. Indeed, even those strands of literature which have argued vigorously
against the existence of any possibility for monetary policy to improve
real outcomes have heavily emphasized the negative results to follow,
typically via the speed or variability of price inflation, from an ill chosen
(according to that view) policy regime.
The basic theme of this paper, in contrast to much of the extensive
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connectingmonetary and financial variables to the business cycle exhibit
fewif any strongly persistent regularities which have remained even
approximately invariant in the context of the widespread and, in some
instances,dramatic changes undergone by the U.S. financial markets over
familiar time periods both long and short. At a qualitative level, of
course, broadly familiar regularities have characterized many monetary
and financial aspects of U.S. business fluctuations. The procyclical
behavior of money, credit and interest rates is well known, as is the
tendency of money and credit growth to "lead" real economic growth at
major business cycle turning points. Nevertheless, these characteristic
qualitative features of most business fluctuations have not corresponded
to persistent regularities in the quantitative relationships that constitute
the main focus of modern business cycle analysis.
The finding that stable quantitative relationships to monetary
andfinancialvariables have been absent from the U.S. business cycle
experience does not mean that monetary and financial phenomena are
unimportant elements of business fluctuations, nor that there is no
consistentbasis for seeking to understand or explain these phenomena.
The basic monetary and financial elements of economic behavior have no—3—
doubt persistedin some fundamental sense. The problem is instead that
these basic elements of economic behavior do not correspond straightforwardly
in theory or closely in practice to the specific quantities that economists
can typically measure. In addition, the relevant behavior is probably
far too complex to be readily represented in simple linear relationships
limited to very few variables.
From the perspective of positive economics based on familiar and
available data, therefore, the main message of this paper is that simple
relationships usually taken to be central to monetary and financial aspects
of business cycles have in the past changed often and much. From the
perspectiveof inferences about monetary policy, the chief implication
isa warning against proceeding as if any one, or a few of these simple
relationships will reliably remain immutable.
Changes inthe working of the U.S. financial markets that are
potentially important for monetary and financial aspects of business
fluctuationsare not difficult to identify. Within the twentieth century
the entire apparatus and orientation of U.S. monetary policy have undergone
several dramatic shifts. In addition to monetary policy, major changes
in government regulationand the expansion of government intermediation
have been further potentially important and often shifting influences.
Moreover, the nation's private financial institutions and practices have
alsoundergone profound and far reaching changes over these years, in part
inresponse to changing patterns of government regulation and monetary
policy but as a result, too, of private institutions' taking advantage of
newdevelopmentselsewhere in the economy.
Jny attempt to see whether the monetary and financial aspects
ofU.S.economic fiuctuatiors have remained invariant, or nearly so, in—4--
theface of these financial market changes must at theoutsetconfront the
methodological choice between structural and reduced-form approaches to this
question. A structural framework imposes potentially valuable restrictions
onthe wayin which the corresponding empirically estimated model summarizes
thequantitative relationships exhibited by the prior experience in question.
Whatever analysis is grounded in a specific structural model is therefore
conditional on those restrictions. Istrictions that are valid reflections
ofactual economic behavior will enable the model to extract the relevant
behavioral relationships more efficiently from the available data, but
incorrector arbitrary restrictions will distort the representation of those
relationships. Either kind of error can introduce the appearance of change
wherein fact there has been continuity, or of continuity where there has
been change.
The subject of monetary and financial influences on economic
fluctuations is not lacking for suggested structural frameworks. One
long—familiar strand of thinking along these lines, which has emphasized
interest rate, asset price, and credit rationing effects on specific kinds of
spending, is the expanded IS—LM aggregate demand model typical of the
post—Keynesian neoclassical synthesis, perhaps best exemplified empirically
by the MPS model.2 A closely related line of structural analysis, which
has placed more emphasis on portfolio substitutions and asset valuations,
is the disaggregated asset market approach of Tobin (1961, 1969) and
Erunner and Meltzer (1972, l97). A third line of analysis, which in its
structural components is also related to these two, but which has more
narrowly emphasized the role of monetary assets in affecting aggregate
demand, is the monetarist model of Friedman (1956, 1971), as exemplified
empirically by the St. uis model.3 A more different line of structural—5—
analysis is the rational expectations model of aggregate supply developed
by Lucas (1972, 1973), and exemplified empirically by Sargent (1976). A
still more recent line of analysis has been the explicit banking sector
model of Fama (l980a, 198Gb).4 Moreover, each of these different structural
approaches essentially refers to a closed economy. To the extent that the
U.S. economy's increasing openness may also be important for monetary and
financial aspects of economic fluctuations, the range of choice —and,
consequently, of potential disagreement —isonly greater.
The approach taken in this paper is to sidestep the choice among,
or synthesis of, these disparate structural models, and to employ instead
only a reduced-form empirical approach that in principal is compatible
with any of them. The basic advantage in this approach is to avoid making
the analysis conditional on explicit structural restrictions that would
attract sharp disagreement from the outset, and that could indeed be
incorrect. The key disadvantages are the loss of efficiency in the extraction
of the relevant quantitative relationships from the data and, correspondingly,
the loss of explicit connection between the estimated relationships and
more specific elements of monetary and financial behavior.
SectionI sets the stage for the empirical analysis by briefly
reviewing the major twentieth century changes in the U.S. financial
markets that would make it surprising if there had been no significant
changesin the monetary and financial aspects of U.S.economic fluctuations
duringthis period —atleast under the view that the prevailing institutions,
including government structures as well as private business practices,
importantly affect economic behavior. Section II documents at a
qualitative level the familiar interrelatedness of money, credit, interest
rates and nonfinancial economic activity in a business cycle context, but—6—
then goes on to point out some changes in these relationships over time
thatare apparent even at a very simple level of analysis. Section III
digresses to consider the relationships connecting money, credit and
their respective "velocities" to the flucutations of both nominal and
real income during the economy's seven and one—half recognized business
cycles since World War II. Section IV applies formal time—series and
frequency-domainmethods to examine at a quantitative level,and in an
explicitlydynamic context, the familiar relationships introduced in
Section II. Section V pursues this line of analysis further, to determine
whether differences in these familiar relationships from one timeperiod
toanother are signficant not just in a statistical sense but economically
as well. Section VI digresses again to consider the post—warevidence on
the economy's "credit cycle." Section VII concludes by summarizing the
principaleitirical findings presented throughout the paper.i. the U.S. Economy'sFinancialStructure
whether or not the monetary and financial aspects of economic
fluctuations in the United States have changed their character over any
specific period of time within the twentieth century, for example, or
since World War II, or since October 1979 —isan empirical issue. Before
examining the evidence on this question, however, it is appropriate to ask
whether during the relevant timeperiodthere have been changes in the
economy's underlying financial structure that, at least in principle, could
have effected changes in the cyclical relationships between monetary and
financial variables and nonfinancial economy activity. Three broad
categories of changes in the U.S. economy's financial structure stand out
in this regard.
First, within the time period spanned by available data (and studied
in this paper) ,theentire apparatus and orientation of U.S. monetary
policy have undergone dramatic shifts. Before 1914 the United States had no
central bank as such, but relied instead on a largely unregulated national
banking system anchored by a gold standard. Prompted by a recurrent series
of financial crises and panics, especially in 1901, 1907 and 1913, Congress
created a new Federal Reserve System charged with the basic task of
preserving stability in the financial markets —more specifically,
instructed "to furnish an elastic currency." The macroeconomic objectives
almost universally associated with monetary policy in the post World War II
era, including especially the objective of price stability, received no
mention in the original Federal Peserve Act.
Between 1914 and World War II, monetary policy evolved in a variety
of ways, as Federal Peserve decision makers gradually came to understand
what effects the System's open market purchases and sales of government—8—
securitieshadinthe new world of fractional reserve banking directly
based on central bank liabilities. The establishment in 1923 of what
subsequently evolved into today's Federal Open Market Committee led
temporarily to an increasing emphasis on open market operations inamonetary
policy context, but in the 1930s the confusions of the depression and the
associated international monetary crisis, including the abandonment of the
gold standard in 1934, arrested the developmont of the monetary policy
mechanism. Then, during World War II and thereafter until 1951, this
evolution effectively ceased as the Federal Reserve assumed an obligation
to support the open market price of the government's outstanding debt (which
was then almost entirely a war loan)
In 1951 the Treasury—Federal Reserve Accord relieved the central
bank of this obligation, and monetary policy assumed the quasi—independent
macroeconomic role ithas playedever since. Even so, there have been
severalmajor changes in monetary policy orientation and procedures since
then.In the early post-Accord years, the Federal Reserve keyed its
operations to the net free reserve position of the commercial banking system.
By the late 1960s, the principal policy focus had changed to setting
interest rates on short—term debt instruments, sometimes Treasury bills
andlater on federal funds. From 1970 onward, quantity targets for
the growth of various aggregative measures of money and credit, including
especially the narrowly defined money stock (Ml), played a generally increasing
albeit sporadic role in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy.
In 1979 the Federal Reserve announced a renewed emphasis on these quantity
growth targets and adopted new operating procedures, based on the growth rate
of nonborrowed bank reserves, for achieving them. In 1982 the Ml target was
publicly suspended, however, and the weight placed on even the broader money
and credit targets in 1982 and 1983 was uncertain. As of the time of writing,the role of quantity growth targets in U.S.monetarypolicy may be
central, irrelevant or, more likely, somewhere in between.
Second, the often shifting evolution of monetary policy has hardly
been the only way in which actions of the federal government (not to mention
those of state governments) have effected structural changes that may
well have altered, perhaps importantly, how the economy's financial and
nonfinancial markets interact in a business cycle context.6 Government
regulatory actions have also been a potentially important and often
changing influence. The three most dramatic such changes —theinsurance
of private bank deposits, the prohibition of interest on demand deposits,
and the separation of the commercial banking and securities industries —
alltook effect in the l930s. Further potentially important changes in
bank regulation and supervision have occurred since then from time to tin,
including most prominently the key legislation governing bank holding
companies in the late 1960s and the deregulation of banks and other
depository institutions in the early 1980s. Moreover, in several further
complete turns of the wheel, the prohibition of interest on demand deposits
hasbecome effectively inoperative within the past decade, while long-standing
prohibitions on interstate banking and on banking firms engaging in the
securities business (andvice versa) are even now becoming fictional. Perhaps
mostimportantly, in recent years the entire distinction between transactions
balances and savings balances has become blurred to the point of meaninglessness.
changes in government financial regulation have also extended well
beyondthe banking system and other depository institutions. The
securities legislation of the 1L93Os created a whole new separate industry,
and subsequent regulation has continued to affect how it works. Key regulatory
changes effected by the Securities and Exchange Commission have ranged—10--
from requiring competitive bidding in most public utilitycompany
underwritingsbeginning inthe 1950s, to allowing the spread of open—
endmutual funds beginning in the 1960s, to prohibiting fixed minimum
commissions on stock exchange brokerage beginning in the 1970s, to
permitting shelf" offerings of corporate securities beginning in the
1980s. As a result of these and many other regulatory actions over the
years, the securities markets in the United States function differently
todaythan they thu inearlier times.
TheNational Banking Act of 1933 introduced deposit interest rate
ceilings, in part. as a response to banks' alleged overly aggressive
bidding for interbank demand deposits during the l920s. The ceilings have
also applied to time and saving deposits, however, and in this context
they have at times had enormous impacts on the workings of the financial
markets and on the financing of economic activity. Specific episodes of
disintermediation during the 1960s and 1970s, due to Regulation Qceiling
rates that remained low in comparison to sharply rising market interest
rates, led to the rise of whole new patterns of portfolio behavior and to
periodic depression in the homebuilding industry. The Federal Reserve System
first moved to eliminate these adverse effects in 1970 by suspending the
ceiling on interest paid on most large bank certificates of deposit. As of
the time of writing, these ceilings appear to be on the way out altogether
as a result of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980.
A related development in the government's role in the credit market,
whichcameabout in part in response to the distortions caused by deposit
interest ceilings, has been the great increase in government intermediation.
The Federal Home Loan Bank System and the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank—11---
began operations before World War II, but the scale of their activity was small
at first and their initial focus was on agricultual credit. The Federal
National Mortgage Association began its lending operations in 1955.Only in
the 1960s and 1970s, however, as periodic disintermediation became severe,
did the scope and size of government financial intermediation expand
greatly. In recent years, the government sponsored credit agencies have
been joined by pools issuing mortgage—backed securities that are not only
government sponsored but, in some cases, formally guaranteed. As of
the late 1960s, and as recently as 1982, it was not atypical for these
quasi—government institutions to account for half or more of all home
mortgage lending in the United States in high disintermediation years.
Moreover, in recent years the federal government has extended its direct
loan and loan guarantee operations far beyond housing— and agriculture—
related credits, to the benefit of such diverse borrowers as college students,
New York City, and the Lockheed and Qrysler corporations.
Third, the nation!s private financial institutions and practices
have undergone profound and far reaching changes over these years, in part
in responseto changing patterns of government regulation and monetary
policy butalso in large part as a result of private initiatives taking
advantage of new developments elsewhere in the economy, including
especially the rapidly changing technology of communicationsand data
processing.New formsofdeposits (for example, negotiable time certificates,
Eurodollar credits, and money market deposit accounts) and new securities
(for example, variable—rate mortgages, floating—rate notes, interest rate
futures, and listed stock options) have come, and in some cases gone. So
have new kinds of financial institutions (for example, money market mutual
funds and mortgage pass-through pools).—12—
Otherforms ofchange in private financial practices have been more
gradual, but potentially just as important. The nation's financial
markets have steadily become less segmented, and presumably more efficient
in the classic sense. Diverse regional markets have become more integrated,
though still far from entirely so, and barriers separating different kinds
of borrowers from different kinds of depositors or lenders have steadily
eroded. Meanwhile, some institutions like pension fundsandcredit unions
have grown rapIdly in relative terms, while others like insurance companies
and mutual savings banks have done the opposite. In a further series of
developments of potentially very great importance for the questions at
issue here, the U.S. financial markets as a whole have at times becomeless
open to foreign participation, and more recently more so, as capitalcontrols
have come and gone, while most (though not all) foreign markets have become
more accessible from here. Indeed, during large parts of the period under
study here, many key foreign currencies simply were not convertible.
Although adequately summarizing the elements of these private
financial market changes that are of greatest potential importance in a
business cycle context is probably impossible, given the space available
here, several basic trends that are relevant in this context stand out. One
is that transactions costs have fallen, irregularly but persistently nonetheless,
overthe period under study in this paper. Pnother is that financial assets
have increasingly become negotiable, and those which have always been
negotiablehave become more liquid. A third is that, despite the potentially
very important episodes of retrogression, financial marketsaround the world
have in fact become more closely integrated.
In light of these changes in the role of monetary policy, in government
regulations and intermediation, and in private financial institutionsand
practices, it would be astonishing if there had been no changes atall-13-
in the relationships connecting money, credit and interest rates to U.S.
economic fluctuations. In the context of business cycles, however, as
opposed to a study of financial markets per se, what matters is whether
these (or still other) changes have brought about significant, and
economically important, changes in such relationships at the macroeconomic
level.—14—
II. BasicCyclicalRelationships in Monetary andFinanca1Data
The four panels of Figure 1 give an overview of the basic relationships
of four key monetary and financial variables to U.S. economic fluctuations
by showing these variables' annual variation from either 1891 or 1919 to the
present. The figure does not explicitly include any measure of
nonfinancialeconomic activity, but the conventional shadings indicate
business contractions as designated by the National Bureau.
The toppanel of the figure shows the annual percentage change in
the money stock, measured both by the Friedman—Schwartz "old M2" concept
for18 91-1975 and by the "new Ml" concept for 1919-82. The "old M2" measure
includescurrency held by the public plus "adjusted" total deposits at
commercial banks but not at nonbank depository institutions (and also,
since 1961, excluding large certificates of deposit) .The"new Ml" measure
isthat adopted in 1980 (as "Mi-B") by the Federal Reserve System,
including currency held by the public plus all checkable deposits other than
thoseheld by foreign commercial banks and official institutions, and
as amended in 1982 to include travellers' checks.8 As is well known from
the work of Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 1970, 1983) and others, the
major historical fluctuations in U.S. nonfinancial economic activity have
been accompanied by often sharp fluctuations in the rate of money growth.
Prominent examples that stand out in the figure include the episodes of
negative money growth in 1921, 1931 and 1949, and the sharp slowing of money
growth in 1938. Especially during the post World War II period, however,
fluctuations in economic activity and variations in money growth have both
been more modest. The comovernent of money growth and real economic growth
has been less pronounced also, although it is still readily visible.FIGURE 1
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Interest Rote on Commercial Paper
Interest Rote on Corporate Bonds—15—
Thesecond panel of Figure 1 shows the annual percentage change in
domesticnonfinancial credit, including the total outstanding credit
market indebtedness of all U.Spublic and private sector borrowers other
than financial intermediaries.9 As is documented in Friedman (1981, 1983a)
domestic nonfinancial credit has also borne a close relationship to U.S.
nonfinancial economic activity, especially in the post-war period. Even
before World War II, however, several major episodes of negative credit
growth, including those in 1921, 1931 and 1938, stand out as having
occurred in conjunction with recognized economic fluctuations.
The bottom two panels of Figure 1 show the annual average levels
of interest rates on prime 4—6 month commercial paper offered in New York,
and on Baa—rated corporate bonds, respectively.10 The main features that
stand out immediately in the interest rate data are the great volatility of
both short- and long—term rates before 1930 and after 1970, the extraordinarily
low level of both rates during the late 1930s and early 1940s, and the persistent
upward trend since World War II. Js is thoroughly familiar, however,
interest rates also fluctuate cyclically, and many of the recognized business
cycle episodes during this period also coincide with readily visible interest
rate movements.
Table 1 focuses more closely on the comovernents of both the 4l money stock
and domestic nonfinancial credit with economic activity by arranging seasonally
adjusted quarterly data in the context of the seven and one—half complete
episodes since World War II designated as contractions and expansions bythe
National Bureau.11 For each designated contraction or expansion, the taJle
12
shows the average per annum growth rate of money and credit, respectively.
Despite the secular post—war trend toward faster growth of moneyand credit,TABLE 1
POST-WAR CYCLICAL MOVEMENTS OF MONEY AND CREDIT
Average Growth Rate Average Growth Rate


































Mean for AllExpansions 4.76% 8.21%
Note:Values shown are in percent per annum.—16—
thestrongly cyclical aspect of both money growth and credit growthstands
out clearly in these summary data. Money growth in expansions hasexceeded
money growth in contractions by nearly 1 3/4% per annum on average,while
credit growth in expansions has exceeded credit growth in contractions by
nearly 1 1/2% per annum on average. The basic cyclical regularityis much
more striking than these average differences suggest, however. Moneygrowth
in each expansion was faster than in the preceding contraction, and money growth
was slower in each contraction than in the preceding expansion.Similarly,
credit growth in each expansion was faster than credit growth in the preceding
contractions and credit growth in each contraction was slower than inthe
preceding expansion.
Table 2 presents analogous data (not seasonally adjusted) for the
post—war cyclical levels and movements of short— and long—terminterest
rates. Once again a secular post—war trend, toward higher interestrates
and larger (absolute) interest rate changes, stands out immediately.
Interest rates have also exhibited strong cyclical regularities, but they
are not so striking as in the case of money and credit growth.Interest
rate levels have been lower in expansions than in contractions byabout
3/4% on average, but there has hardly been uniformity inthis respect.
In only two expansions were short—term interest rates lowerthan in the
previouscontraction, and in only one expansion was the long—term rate lower
(by more than a single basis point)
Bycontrast, the chief cyclical regularity that does stand out in
Table 2 is the rise of the short—term interest rate in every expansionand
the corresponding decline in every contraction. The 6 3/4% (algebraic)































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































contractions, respectively, dwarfs the small difference in the corresponding
average levels. The long—term interest ratehas also risen in all seven
post-war expansions and declined in six of the eightcontractions, although
here the (algebraic) difference for the respective average changeshas
been much smaller, as most familiar theories of the pricing of long— versus
short—term assets imply.
In summary, both the annual data plotted in Figure 1 andthe cycle-
specific averages of quarterly data shown in Tables 1 and2 give the
impression of strong and persistent regularities in the monetaryand
financial aspects of U.S. economic fluctuations. On closer inspection,
however, many of these regularities turn out not to be so regular or so
persistent after all. Although the investigation of theserelationships
in a dynamic context is the subject of SectionslV and V below, Table 3 provides
a quick overview by showing simple correlationcoefficients relating the
annual movements of the monetary and financial variables plottedin
Figure 1 to the annual percentage change in real grossnational product.14
For the nonetary and credit aggregates, the table also shows analogous
correlations for the corresponding aggregates deflated by the grossnational
productrri.ce deflation.
In order to highlight changes in these relationships over time,
Table 3 presents correlation coefficients separately for the preWorld War I
(l89l19l6)qinter—war (1919—40), and postWorld War II(1947—82) periods,
and also for two sub-periods (1947-65 and l966-32) within the post-war period.
Especially from the perspective of changes in monetary policy,other possible
breaks in the post-war period would also be logical, including1951 when
theTreasury—Federal Reserve Accord took effect, 1970 when theFederalTABLE 3
SIMPLU ANNUAL CORRELATIONS WITH REALECONOMICGROWTH
1891—1916 1919—40 1947—82 1947—65 1965—82
.20 —.22 —.02 —.18
Money (Ml) .69*** .17 .46** •43*
43* .05 .19 .13
.28 —.04 .11 —.06
pealBalances(Ml) 77*** .42*** .56** .36
.19 .12 .13 .05
—.02 .09 .04
Ivioney (M2) .65*** .64*** 22
—.18 .56** .12
—.08 .22 .13
Peal Balances (M2) .85*** 44**
—.29 .34 .10
.25 —.17 .01 .04
Credit .69*** .13 54** .31
.50** —.20 —54** .12
—.00 —.07 —.01 .01
Peal Credit .34 49*** .52** .67***
—.31 .15 —.38 .56**
—.21 .22 —. 34** —.03 _.48**
Short Rate 39* —.24 —.65*** _•49** 79***
.56*** .19 .26 55** .20
Long Rate _.65*** —.38** —.05
.03 —.02 —.04 —.01
Notes: ***significant at .01 level
**sjgnifjcant at .05 level
*significant at .10 level—18-
Reserve System first began to employ explicit monetary aggregate targets
and also first began to suspend Regulation Qceilings,and 1979 when the
Federal Peserve (temporarily) adopted new operating procedures. The
break at 1966 roughly separates the early post—war years of low price
inflation, stable real economic growth and few apparent "supply shocks"
from the subsequent years of rapid and accelerating price inflation, less
stable and on average slower real growth, an occasional large supply—
sidedisturbances.
For each monetary or financial variable among the eight considered,
and for each separate time period, Table 3 reports the simple correlation
of the variable's annual percentage change (for interest rates, the absolute
change)with the annual percentage change of real gross national product
for three lead—lag relationships: first with the monetary or financial
variableleading real growth by one year, next contemporaneously, and last
with that variable lagging real growth by one year.
In contrast to the appearance of strong regularities in Figure 1
and in Tables 1 and 2, the dominant impression given by these correlations
is the absence of systematic relationships that have persisted across the
different time periods under consideration.15 The only two consistently
significant relationships are the tendency of real M2 growth to be rapid
(slow) contemporaneously with rapid (slow) real growth, and of long-term
interest rates to fall (rise) in the year before a year of rapid (slow)
realgrowth. Nominal Ml growth was strongly positivelycorrelated with
contemporaneousreal growth during the inter—war period, but less so during
either half of the post-war period considered separately and not at all
forthe post—war period overall. Peal Ml growth was strongly correlated
with contemporaneous real economic growth earlier on, but not during the—19—
later post—war period. Neither nominal nor real Mi growth has shown a
significant lead or lag relationship to real economic growth on an annual
basis. Nominal M2 growth was strongly positively correlated with
contemporaneousreal growth during the pre—war and inter—war periods, but
not since World War II.
Nominalcredit growth resembles nominal Mlgrowth in being strongly
postively correlated with contemporaneous real economic growth during
the inter—war period and the early post—war period, but not for the
later post—war period or for the post—war period as a whole. For the
inter—war and early post—war periods, lagged credit growth has been
significantly correlated with real economic growth, although positively
in the former years and negatively in the latter. Ieal credit growth has
beenpositively correlated with real economic growth on a contemporaneous
basisthroughout the post—war period, but it was not so earlier on.
Finally, both short— and long—term interest rate changes have
been negatively correlated with contemporaneous real economic growth, and
(except for short-term rates in the inter-war period) with the following
year's real growth, throughout the period understudy here. Many of these
correlationsare not significant, however. The contemporaneous relationship for
short—term rates is significant except for the inter-war years, and for
long—term rates itisso except for the early post—war period. The change
inshort—term rates has been positively correlated with the prior year's
real growth, but significantly so only during the pre--war and early
post—war periods.
Simple correlations based on annual data are a crude way of
summarizing economic relationships, of course, even when they allow for—20—
modestleads or lags. Nevertheless, if the regularities connecting
monetary and financial variables to business cycles were sufficiently
powerful and persistent, they wouldbelikely to show up more strongly
even in these simple correlations. That they do not is hardly the end
of the story, but the fact that it is necessary to look harder in order
tofind them is itself suggestive.III. Money,Creditand'\1ocity"in Post-War Business cles
A subject that has run throughout the long standing literature
of monetary and financial aspects of economic fluctuations is therespective
roles in this context of money (or credit) and the associated"velocity"
defined simply as the ratio of nominal income tomoney (or, again, to
credit). Before examining the U.S.experiencein this regard, it is
useful to point out the absence of any economic meaning of "velocity"
as so defined —otherthan, by definition, the income-to—money ratio.
Because the "velocity" label mayseemto connote deposit or currency
turn—over rates, there is often a tendency to infer that "velocity"
defined in this way does in fact correspond to some physicalaspect of
economicbehavior. When the numerator of the ratio is income rather
than transactions or bank debits,, however, "velocity" issimply a
16
ratio.
1sTable 1 shows for the post-war period, both money and credit
growfaster on average during economic expansions than during contractions.
The issue of money or credit movements versus their respective "velocities,"
ina business cycle context, is simply the distinction between movements
of nominal income that match movements of money or credit and movements
of income that do not, and hence that imply movements in the income—to—money
or income—to—credit ratio.
Table 4, using quarterly data for post-war cyclical episodes
exactly analogues to the money and credit growth averages in Table 1, shows
that the "velocity" associated with each aggregate has also exhibited
strong cyclical properties. Monetary velocity, which has had an upward
secular trend since World War II, has risen on average in each expansion—22—
andhas declined on average in six of eight contractions. The average
growthof monetary velocity in expansions has exceeded that in contractions
by about 4 3/4% per annum, a much greater difference thanthe 1 3/4% per
annum shown in Table 1 for money growth itself. Credit velocity,which
has been trendless on average since WorldWar II,has risen on average in
four of six expansions and declined on average in each contraction.
Theaveragegrowth of credit velocity in expansions has exceeded that in
contractionsby about 4 1/4% per annum, again a much larger difference
than the 1 1/4% per annum difference shown in Table 1 for credit growth.
Becausethe numerator of the "velocity" ratio is nominal income,
while business cycle expansions and contractions typically refer to
fluctuations of real economic activity, it is difficult to go much further
in considering money, credit and their respective "velocities"in a business
cycle context without allowing for cyclical variation in priceinflation.
As Table 5 shows, however, during the post-war period priceinflation
has apparently followed the business cycle with a sufficient lag that
the movements of real and nominal gross national product during expansions
and contractions have almost exactly corresponded on average. Real
income, of course, has grown on average in each expansion anddeclined on
average in each contraction, with an (algebraic)difference of nearly 6%
per annum between the mean for all expansionsand the mean for all contractions.
By contrast, because of the upward secular trend in priceinflation, nominal
income declined in the first three post—war contractions butincreased
inthe subsequent five. Even so, the difference between the average growth
of nominal income in expansions and contractions, respectively, hasbeen
about 6 1/2% per annum —almostidentical to the corresponding differenceTABLE 4
POST-WAR CYCLICALMOVEMENTS OF MONEY AND CREDIT "VELOCITIES"
AverageGrowth Rate Average Growth Rate
BusinessCycles of Money "Velocity" ofCredit"velocity"
































Mean for AllContractions —.68% -3.78%
Mean for AllExpansions 4.08% .53%
Note: Values shown are in percent per annum.TABLE 5
POST-WAR CYCLICAL MOVEMENTS OF REAL AND NOMINAL INCOME
Average Growth Rate Average Growth Rate

































an for AllContractions—1.48% 2.40%
Mean for All Expansions 4.35% 8.84%
Note: Values shown are in percent per annum.—23—
for real income. At least for averages across business cycle expansions
and contractions, therefore, relationships to nominal income (like those
based on "velocity ratios) approximately carry over to relationships to
real income, and hence to economic fluctuations in the ordinary business
cyclesense. Table 6 summarizes theserelationships by collecting
the means from Tables 1, 4 and 5 and the correspondingimplied means
ofprice inflation.17
Table7 pursues further the distinction of money and credit
growth versus "velocity" growth by showing ananalysis of variance for
therespective real and nominal income identities summarized in terms
ofmeans in Table 6.Theupper half of the table first decomposes the
variationof real income growth into components representing nominal
growth, price inflation and their covariance, and then decomposes the
variation of nominal income growth into components representing money
growth, "velocity" growth (that is, nominal income growth which does
not correspond tomoney growth) and the associated covariance term.
The first column of the table applies this decomposition only to
contractions, treating each one asa simple observation —inother words,
asking what role money growth, "velocity" growth and price inflation have
played in accounting for differences between one business contraction and
another. The average (negative) real growth rate has varied little among
successive contraction episodes, so that the differenceshere are almost
entirely differences among respective contractions' rates of price inflation
and hence of nominal growth. The results show thatmoney growth variations
have dominated velocity growth variations in accounting for these differences.
Analogous results presented in the second column show an even greaterTABLE 6
CYCLICAL MEANS FOR INCOME, MONEY, CREDIT AND"VELOCITY"
1948: iv—1982: IV
8 Contractions 7 Expansions Difference
Mean X —1.48% 4.35% 5.83%
Mean Y 2.40 8.84 5.44
—Mean p —3.89 —4.51 —.62
Mean Y 2.40% 8.84% 6.44%
Mean M 3.08 4.76 1.68
Mean Vm —.68 4.08 4.76
1953:11—1982: IV
7 Contractions 6 Expansions Difference
Mean X —1.64% 4.02% 5.66%
Mean Y 3.08 8.74 5.66
—Mean p —4.72 —4.72 .00
Mean Y 3.08% 8.74% 5.66%
Mean C 6.86 8.21 1.35
Mean Vc —3.78 .53 4.31
Notes: Values are in percent per annum.
Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
Definitions of variable symbols:
X=growthrate of real GNP
Y =growthrate of nominal GNP
p =growthrate of GNP price deflator
M =growthrate of Ml money stock
Vm=growthrate of Y/M
C =growthrate of domestic nonfinancial credit
Vc =growthrate of Y/CTABLE 7









































































Note: Values are in percent per annum squared.
See Table 6 for definitions of variable symbols.—24—
predominanceof money growth variations over velocity growthvariationsin
accounting for nominal income growth differences across expansions. The final
column of the table presents the results of an analogous decomposition applied
to all contractions and all expansions, again treating each as a single
observation in other words, asking what role money growth, velocity
growth and price inflation have played in accounting for differences not
justamongcontractions or among expansions but also between contractions
and expansions. In this context the respective variations of money
growth and velocity growth have been more nearly coequal, and also importantly
correlated.
Thelower half of Table 7 presents the analogous three sets of
decompositions including credit and credit velocity." The results are
similar to those for money and money velocity shown above, but in each
case with a smaller role for the aggregate, and consequently a greater
rolefor velocity. Variations in credit growth have predominated over
velocity growth variations only in accounting for differences among
expansions. For differences among contractions, the two have been
approximately coequal, and importantly correlated. Variations in credit
velocity, and its correlation with credit growth variations, have been
moreimportant than variations in credit growth per se in the broader
cyclical context of accounting also for differences between expansions and
contractions.—25—
IV.Dynamic Relationships
Simple annual correlations like those showninTable 3 fail to convey
that it is important to know about the comovement of economic time series
in a business cycle context for at least three reasons. First, the relevant
lead—lag relationships may be distributed over either more or less than one
year. The work of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), for example, concluded that
variations in money growth typically lead variations in income growth by
less than a year. Second, even highly significant lead correlations may
merely reflect the interaction of contemporaneous (or even lagged) relationships
among time series that are individually autocorrelated. In contrast to the
propositions that characterized much of the earlier literature of monetary
and financial aspects of economic fluctuations, which typically referred simply
to the comovement among two or more variables, the modern analysis of business
cycles focuses instead on whether movements in one variable are systematically
related to those parts of the movements in another that are not purely
autoregressive. Third, the relationship of one variable to another may depend
on what further variables the analysis includes. The proposition that two
variables exhibit a stable relationship to one another without allowance
forfurther variables implies either that other variables are unimportant
tothat relationship or that whatever other variables are relevant have
not varied (will not vary) significantly during the period under study.
The results presented in this section of the paper extend the simple overview
providedin Table 3so as to take account of each of these potentially
importantconsiderations.
Table8 presentsF—statistics for conventional exogeneity (t1causality")
testsof bivariate annual relationships connecting nominal income growth
respectively to the growth of Ml, M2 and credit, and the change in short-TABLE 8
SU4ARY OF BIVARIATE ANNUAL RELATIONSHIPS: FINANCIAL VARIABLES AND NOMINAL INCOME
1891—1916 1919—40 1947—821947—65 1966—82
uation for Y
F(Y) .21 1.97 1.21 1.20
F(M1) 1.39 6.87***6.38** .32
Equation for Ml
F(Y) 1.13 1.64 .93 .17
F(M1) 477** 13.77***2.83* 4.10**
Equation forY








F(Y) — .16 2.12 .64 5.82**
F(C) — 3.14* 9.83*** .40 ii.i8
Equation forC
.03 18.21***18.17*** 1.98 F(Y)
—
F(C)
— 1.08 64.11***2.59 11.89***
.__..._..__..__._.••.__•.__.._____•_•._..••____•__
Equation forY
.34 2.92* .28 1.01 575** F(Y)
F(Rs) 4Q9** 1.42 1.03 .67 8.82***
Equation forEs
1.70 .88 .51 .21 .77 F(Y)
F(Ps) 9.86*** .95 4.29**3.38* 1.88
Table 8 continued on next pageTable 8 Page 2
Equationfor Y
F(Y) .15 .09 1.12 .37
F(Rl) 6.23** .31 4.32** 191
Equation for Ri
F(Y) .18 1.48 .06 1.48
F(Pi) 1.27 8.49*** .23 1.71
Notes:Values shown are F—statistics
Definitions of variable symbols:
Y =growthrate of nominal GNP
M =growthrate of money stock (Ml or M2)
C =growthrate of domestic nonfinancial credit
=changein prime coumiercial paper rate




*significant at 10 levelTABLE 9
SUMMARYOF BIVARIATE ANNUALFELATIONSHIPS.:FINANCIAL VARIABLESAND PEAL INCOME
1891—1916 1919—40 1947—82 1947—65 1966—82
Equation for X
F(X) .14 .85 1.69 .17
F(N1) .19 773*** 557** 2.42
tionfor Ml
F(X) .19 2.39 4.20** .74













































































Table 9 continued on next pageTaJle 9Page 2
Equationfor X
F(X) .07 .35 2.64 1.21
F(Rl) 357* 4.84** 8.32*** 3.13*
uationfor Ri
F(X) .04 .83 .13 1.99
F(R1) .94 9.89*** .37 2.75
Notes: X =growthrate of real GNP.
mh1c—26--
and long—term interest rates, for the same time periods used in Table 1,
and Table 9 presents analogous results for bivariate relationships to
real economic growth.18 Such exogeneity tests constitute the dern
formal analog to the investigation of leads and lags that has been central
to the more traditional business cycle literature. Once again, however,
the chief impression given by these results is the absence of persistence
over time in familiar simple quantitative relstionships.
The often assumed relationship by which Ml growth helps explain
either nominal or real economic growth, but not vice versa, appears in
the results in Tables 8 and 9 only since World War II, and only when the
first half of the post-war period is included. Growth in M2 helps
explain nominal economic growth only before World War I, and does not
help explain real economic growth in this sense in any of the three periods
studied. Credit growth helps explain nominal income growth both in the
inter—war period and in the post—war period as long as the more recent
post—war years are included, but for the post—war period as a whole nominal
income growth also helps explain credit growth. Credit growth does not
help explain real income growth in this sense in any period. The change
in short—term interest rates helps explain both nominal and real income
growth, but not vice versa, in the pre—war period and in the second half of
the post—war period. The change in long—term interest rates helps explain
bothnominaland real income growth, but not vice versa, in the inter—war
period and the first half of the post-war period.
It is important to distinguish these generally negative findings
from the more traditional propositions, noted and in some cases documented
above, about the comovement in a simple sense, including lead and lag—27--
relationships, connecting income with familiar monetaryandfinancial
variables. As Figure 1 and Tables1-3show, each of the five monetary
and financialvariables considered here has exhibited distinctly cyclical
movements, at least during some time periods. What the tests in Tables 8
and 9 seek to establish, however, is not just whether a variable has
fluctuatedin conjunction with movements in income but whether it has
shown a relationship to that part of the movement in income which is not
explainable in purely autoregressive terms. Even a readily visible simple
relationshipto income fluctuations need not —indeed,evidently often
does notimply a corresponding relationship to the elements of income
fluctuations that are not purely autoregressive.
More importantly, the basic theme of this paper focuses less on
whathelps explain what than on which if any quantitative relationships
have persisted across spans of time during which the U.S. financial markets
haveundergone changes like those reviewed in Section I, which at least in
principle could have importantly affectedthe monetary and financial aspects
ofeconomic fluctuations. Table 10 presents further F-statistics testing
the null hypothesis of absence of structural change in the bivariate
relationships summarized in Tables 8and 9,againstthe alternative hypothesis
ofbreaks at World War II and at the mid-point of the post-war period to date
(and also, for relationships involving M2 and the short—term interest rate,
at World War I). In all but two isolated cases, the data indicate significant
structural change. What is especially striking in the results of these
stability tests is that even sets of coefficients which Tables 8 and 9 report
to be not significantly different from zero are nonetheless significantly
differentfrom one another.TPBLE 10
TEST STATISTICS FOR STABILITL IN BIVARIATE ANNUAL PELATIONSHIPS
Break at 1916 Break at 1940 Break at 1965
Equation for Y 6.15*** 9•34***
Equation for Ml 6.80*** 8.07***
Equation for Y 22.92*** 5.01***
Equation for M2 12.45*** 24.24***
Equation for Y 212** 3449***
Equation for C 15.45*** 55g***
Equation for Y 13.90*** 2.56** 5.23***
Equation for Es 4.26*** 24.16*** 52.23***
Equation for Y 5.12*** 10.93***
Equation for Ri 4.68*** 52.gi***
Equation for X 8.23*** 7.92***
Equation for Ml 6.64*** 13.26***
Equation for X 20.24*** 4.26***
Equation for M2 24.58*** 1549***
Equation for X 1,72 9.42***
Equation for C 18.97*** i0.79***
Equation for X 10.76*** 2.49** 2.16
Equation for Es 6.43*** 22.66*** 50.77***
Equation for X 387*** 10.91***
Equation for El 479*** 55.82***
Note: See Tables 8 and 9.—28—
Annual data, of course, may simply be too coarse to capture the
relevantbehavior connecting these aspects of aggregative economic
activity. Tables 11 and 12 therefore present F-statistics for analogous
bivariate exogeneity tests for the respective relationships of nominal and
realincome growth to the growth of mbney (Ml) and credit and the
change in short— and long—term interest rates, based on quarterly data for
the post World War II period.19 Money growth consistently helps explain
both nominal and real economic growth, as is familiar from previous work,
but these results show that either nominal or real income growth also
typically helpsexplain money growth (so that money does not 'cause'T income
intheGranger sense). Credit growth helps explain nominal income, but
not vice versa, in the second half of the post—war period. For the post-
war period as a whole, credit growth again helps explain nominal income
growth,while thereverse effect is onlymarginally significant.Changes
in short—terminterestrates consistently helpexplainnominal income
growth, but not vice versa, and the same is true with respect to real
income growth in the later post—war years. changes in long—terminterest
ratesnever help explain income at all in this context. Finally, Table 13
shows that most of these quarterly results also fail to exhibit stability
across the earlier and later halves of the post—war period. Further results
(not shown) are also broadly similar for other logical break—points like
those suggested in Section II.
Onereasonwhy relationships like these may appear to be unstable,
of course, is that they are misspecified —forexample, bytheomission
of other relevant variables. Given the results for the bivariate relationships
in Tables 8 and 9 and Tables 11 and 12, in which several monetary and
financial variables each appear to be related to either nominal. orTABLE 11
SUMMARY OFBIVARIATE QUARTERLY RELATIONSHIPS: FINANCIAL VARIABLESAND NOMINALINCOME
1952:I—l982:IV 1952:I—1965:IV 1965:I—l982:IV
Equation for Y
F(Y) 3.84*** 2.23* .28
F(M) 1O.28*** 2.13* 2.80**
Equationfor M
F(Y) 4Q9*** 2.30* 1.01






































F(Y) 6.33*** 8.39*** .32
F(R1) .94 1.42 .69
Equationfor El
F(Y) .88 1.36 .81
F(R1) 2.04* 1.10 339**
Notes: Values shown are F—statistics.
Definitions of variable symbols:
Y=growthrate of nominal GNP
M=growthrate of Ml money stock
C=growthrate of domestic nonfinancial credit
Es =changein prime commercial paper rate




*significantat .10 levelTABLE 12
SUNMARY OF BIVARIATE JARTEPWY RELATIONSHIPS: FINA4CIAL_VARIABLES AND REAL INCOME
1952:I—1982:IV 1952 :1—1965 :IV 1966:I—1982:IV
atiofor X
F(X) 3.91*** 343** 135
F(M) 3.81*** 3.72** 3.32**
ationfor N
F(X) 2.71** 2.30* 97
F(M) 21.02*** 7.24*** 2.05*
Equation for X
F(X) 3.16** 6.83*** .89
F(C) .69 3.l2** 54
Equation for C
F(X) 494*** 439*** .84
F(C) 58.09*** 1.49 24.15***
Equation for X
F(X) 4.61*** 357** 2.63**
F(Bs) 544*** 1.20 5.81***
Eqp.at ionforEs
F(X) 3.70*** 3.46** 1.95
F(Ps) 7.40*** 43Q*** 39Q***
Equation for X
F(X) 547*** 4.90*** 1.91
F(R1) 1.00 .88 .75
Equation for El
F(X) 1.31 2.18* 1.73
F(Pl) 2.35* 1.39 3.10**
Notes: X =growthrate of real GNP.
See TaJle 11.TABLE 13
TEST STATISTIShyINBIVARIATEUARTERLYRELATIONSHIPS
Break at 1965:IV
Equation for Y 1.24
Equation for M 1.70*
Equation for Y 2.29**
Equation for C 2.94***
Equation for Y 5.58***
EquationforEs .79
Equation for Y
Equation for P1 1.77*
Equation for X 2.12**
Equation for M 2.30**
Equation for X 1.81*
Equation for C 2.76***
Equation for X 1.63
Equation for Ps .31
Equation for X .83
Equation for El 2.51***
Note: See Tables 11 and 12.—29—
real income growth at least in some periods, it is difficult to justify the
use of only bivariate relationships. Table 14 presents F—statistics for
analogous exogeneity tests based on a five—variable annual system including
real income growth, price inflation, money (Ml) growth, credit growth and
the change in the short—term interest rate, for the same inter—war and
post—war periods studied earlier.
Even with only three monetary and financial variables in the system,
however, it is difficult to draw any solid conclusions from this expanded
analysis. Among the three, only money growth significantly helps explain
real income growth —giventhe presence of the other included variables
in any period examined, and even this effect is evident only for samples
including the first half of the post—warperiod.20 At the same time, real
income growth helps explain both money growth and credit growth during the
full post—war period, and also helps explain money growth during the later
post—war years. Peal income growth only marginally helps explainthe short-
term interest rate change. Once again, what significant regularities do
appear have not been regular enough to persist acrossdifferent time periods.
The same generalization also characterizes analogous results for
multivariate systems estimated for the post World War II period using
quarterly data. There is little point in displaying vast quantities of
empirical results along these lines, since the basic lack of consistency
is readily apparent just from a summaryofwhat does and does not help
explain real income growth in quarterly systems based on different sub—
periods. For the quarterly version of the same five—variable system shown
in Table 14, neither money growth nor credit growth nor the short-term
interest rate change significantly helps explain real income growth, even—30—
atthe .10 level —again,given the presence of one another —for1952:1—
l982:IV, 1952:I—1965:IV or 1966:I—l982:iV. By contrast, for the four—
variable system estimated for 1953:I-1978:iV in Friedman (1983a), including
all of the same variables as in Table 14 except the interest rate change,
money growth and credit growth each significantly help explain real
income growth at the .05 level.21 Similarly, for the six-variable system
estimated for 1962:111-1979:111 in claridaandFriedman (1984), including
allofthe same variables as in Table 14 plus the change in the federal
government budget deficit, credit growth significantly helps explain real
income growth at the .01 level, money growth does so at the .05 level,
and the short-term interest rate change does so at the .10 level.22
Moreover, these multivariate relationships too show significant
evidence of instability from one time period to another, thereby
revealing that the instability of the bivariate systems documented in
Table10 is not due to anything so sinpie as merely omitting a small number
of familiar variables. Table 15 presents F—statistics testing the null
hypothesis of absence of structural change in the five—variable annual
relationships summarized in Table 14, and in the corresponding quarterly
relationships, against the alternative hypothesis of a break between the
inter—war and post—war periods or between the first and second halves of
the post—war period. The annual data indicate significant structural
change ineachrelationship at World War II,thoughonlyforthe interest
rate equation at 1965.Theappearance of stability between the first and
second halves of the post-war period isprobablyjust due to lack of
degrees of freedom, however, since the corresponding quarterlydata indicate













































































.99 2.74* .64 3.70* F(X)
F(P) .54 1.62 .07 .35
F(M) .41 1.12 .07 2.15
F(C) 2.15 2.38 .12 1.51
F(Ps) .27 2.24 .29 2.16
Notes: Variables shown are F—statistics.
Definitions of variable symbols:
X =growthrate of real GNP
P =growthrate of GNP price deflator
M=growthrate of Ml money stock
C =growthrate of domestic nonfinancial credit








































































































































































































































































































































































sum, neither using quarterly data in place of annual, nor using multivariate
systems in place of bivariate, nor doing both at once, overturns the
general finding of heterogeneity from one period to another in the monetary
and financial aspects of economic fluctuations.
Finally, because the very notion of business "cycles" suggests the
possibility of comovements that recur at possibly regular intervals, it is
interesting to see whether the frequency—domain properties of the comovements
studiedhere can provide further information to supplement the time—domain
properties reported above. In particular, what light can the associated
frequency—domain properties of these data shed on familiar questions like
the "leads and lags" of monetary and financial aspects of economic fluctuations?
]\s would be expected, frequency—domain methods immediately confirm
the presence of strong cyclical comovements along the lines reported in
Section II. The top two panels of Figure 2 showthe respective power
spectra of rtoney growth and credit growth, estimated using the fuLl sets
ofavailable post-war quarterly data spanning 1947:I-l982:IV for money and
1952:I-l982:IVfor credit.23 Both spectra display substantial "noise"
athigh frequencies say, 1.5 radians and above. More importantly from
the perspective of the questions addressed here, both also display
significant power at or near frequencies plausibly related to recognized
businesscycles. The record of seven complete cycles from the peak in
1948:IV to that in 1981:111 implies a mean cycle length of just under 19
calendar quarters, equivalent to a frequency of almost exactly 1/3 radian.


















































































































































































































































Closeranalysis of these two power spectra indicates, however, that
therespectivefrequency-domain properties of money and credit growth
are not identical. In the range of .20— .79 radian, corresponding to a
periodof 2—8 years, the value of the test statistic for the null hypothesis
of no difference between the two spectra is 3.90 (distributed normally with
22 degrees of freedom), indicating that the two spectra do differ
significantly at the .01 level.24 Onewayto explore further the nature
ofthis difference in the frequency-domain properties of money and credit
growth is to examine their respective coherences with real income growth,
shown in the bottom two panels of Figure 2. Not surprisingly, both
coherences display increases at about 1/3 radian. In the same range of
.20— .79 radian, the coherence of real income growth with money growth is
.98 with standard error .01, while the coherence of real income growth with
25 credit growth is .96 with standard error .02.
Inthe same vein as the analysis of lead and lag relationships via the
bivariate exogeneity tests reported above, a plausible question to ask in
thiscontext is whether these respective coherences indicate that either
money growth or credit growth, or both, tend to lead real income growth.
In fact, both do so, and creditsonwhat more so, although the indicated
leads are both surprisingly short in comparison to those usually suggested
in the time-domain literature. Money growth leads real income growth bya
phaseangleof only .11 radian (or .35 quarter, based on the 20 quarter
midpoint of the 2-8 year range) with standard error .05, while credit
growth leads real income growth by .32 radian (or 1.02 quarters) with
standard error .06. Even so, the difference between these two leads is not
statistically significant. The value of the test statistic for the null—33—
hypothesis of no difference between the twocoherencesin the same .20— .79
radian range is only .39 (distributed as a t-statisticwith22 degrees of
freedom) ,notsignificant at any reasonable level.
In addition, in the same vein as the analysis of partial relationships
via the multivariate exogeneity tests reported above, a further plausible
question to ask in this context is whether the partial coherence of either
money growth or credit growth with real income growth is significantly
different from zero —inother words, whether either adds significantly
to explaining the frequency—domain properties of real income growth —
giventhe presence of the other. \s is largely consistent with the
time—domainresults, the answer is no in both cases •Forthe same range
of.20-.79 radian,the values of the relevant test statistic (distributed
as an F-statistic with 2and20degreesof freedom) are .04forthe
additionalrole of money growth and .42 for the additional role of credit
growth. Neither value is significant at any reasonable level.—34—
V. Statistical Significance and Economic Significance
The results of the stability tests reported in Tables 10 and 15 indicate
strong evidence of statistically significant differences, between one
time period and another, in both bivariate and multivariate relationships
summarizing the monetary and financial aspects of U.S. economic fluctuations.
For many purposes, however, the statistical significance of such differences
does not necessarily mean that they are significant in a broader economic
sense. After all, two corresponding coefficients, estimated for different
time periods, can differ by an amount that is statistically significant
but economically trivial if each is individually measured with sufficient
precision. In addition, in dynamic relationships involving several coefficients,
offsetting shifts in different coefficients can. leave important properties
of the resulting overall relationship unaffected.
The structural shifts in the monetary and financial aspects of the
u.s. business cycle experience reported above are signficiant not just
statistically but economically as well. Table 16 shows the full sets of
estimation results for the bivariate annual relationship between real income
growth and money growth summarized in the top panel of Table 9, for 1919-40,
1947—65 and 1966-82, respectively. As Table 10 shows, the data indicate
statistically signficant shifts in these two estimated relationships.
Comparison of the three full sets of results shown in Table 16 confirms that
these significant differences are typically due not to small changes in a
few precisely measured coefficients but to one or even several quite large
changes, sometimes even involving switches of sign.
Figure 3 shows the implications of the differences among these
respective sets of estimated coefficients for the overall relationshipTRELE 16
BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS BE[WEEN REAL INCOME AND MONEY
1919— 1940
x= .019+ .190X —.106X + .277M —.157M
t t-1 t—2 t—l t—2
(.9)(.5) (—.3) (.6) (—.4)
2 =.00 SE =.089 0W =2.02
Mt =.022+.O24Xtl + .156Xt2 + .7O2Mtl —.SSlMt2
(1.3) (.1) (.6) (1.9) (—1.9)
2.28 SE =.071 DW =1.66
1947—1965
X
=.060—.156Xtl+.351Xt2 + .l42Mti —l.2lMt2
(4.1)(—.5) (1.5) (.3) (—3.3)
2=.32 SE =.023 OW =146
Mt =.020+.Ol8Xtl + .365Xt2 + .2l6Mi —.596Mt2
(2.6)(.1) (2.8) (.8) (—2.9)
2=.38 SE =.013 OW =2.13
1966—1982
X =.089+.2llXtl —.164X2+ .269Mti —.S37Mt2
(3.0)(.5) (—.5) (—.4) (—1.2)
2=.19 SE =.024 DW =2.01
Mt =.045—.034Xi
—. 147X2+ .429Mi —.O7lMt2
(2.8)(—.2) (—.9) (1.1) (—.2)
2=.02 SE =.013 DW =2.17
Notes:X=growthrate of real GNP
M=growthrate of Mlmoneystock
=adjustedcoefficient of determination
SE =standarderror of estimate
DW =Durbin-Watsonstatistic
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between real income growth and money growth by tracing out the first ten
years of the dynamic response pattern exhibited by the solved—out (butnot
orthogonalized) moving-average representation of each of the three estimated
bivariate autoregressions. The implied own—disturbance responses shown in
theupper left and lower right panels of the figure are roughly similar
among the three systems, but the implied cross—disturbance responses
shown in the upper right and lower left panels diverge sharply and even
include differences in the direction of the initial responses.
Table 17 and Figure 4 present analogous sets of estimation results
and associated dynamic response patterns for the bivariate annual relationship
between real income growth and credit growth summarized in the middle panel
of Table 9. Here again large differences appear among corresponding
coefficients estimated for different timeperiods,as do readily visible
differences among the implied response patterns, especially for the respective
cross—responses. In addition, further results (not shown) indicate
similar large differences for systems relating the growth of either money
or credit to nominal income gowth1 as well as for systems relating either real or
nominal income growth to the change in short—term interest rates. Finally,
still further results (also not shown) indicate large differences in the
results for analogous systems based on quarterly data, estimated for
1947:I—l965:IV and1966:I—1982:IV.
In sum, the differences between one time period and another that
characterize the monetary and financial aspects of U.S. economic fluctuations
have been significant both statistically and economically, reflecting major
differences in the magnitude as well as the timing of the comovements between
income and money, credit and interest rates.TABLE 17






(1.1) (.5) (—.2) (.8) (—1.3)






(1.5)(1.1) (—.3) (1.0) (—.1)




(.4) (—.8) (1.0) (1.3) (—.8)
2=—.16 SE =.029 DW =1.95
C =.045—. 389X1+.l35Xt2+.647Ci
—.242C2
(3.7)(—3.9) (1.2) (2.8) (—1.1)





(1.7)(—.03) (—.17) (1.4) (—1.8)





(2.5)(—1.4) (—.7) (3.7) (—1.5)
2=.65 SE =.010 DW =2.27








































IN C 0N X tX/C SYSTEM)
9.00 1: 5.00
IN C ØN C tX/C SYSTEM)
FIGURE 4
9.00—36—
vi. The Credit Ojcle
A final financial aspect of U.S. economic fluctuations that bears
investigation here is the familiar "credit cycle" by which the economy's
public and private sectors alternate over the business cycle in their
respective volumes of credit market borrowing. In brief, the basic idea
behind this familiar notion is that federal government reliance on the
credit market typically bulges when weakness in the economy enlarges the
government's budget deficit, while the private sector's borrowing does just
theopposite as aconsequence of the cyclical variation of typically debt-
financedspending. 2s a result, federal government borrowing is greater in
economic contractions than in expansions, while private sector borrowing is
greater in expansions than in contractions. This cyclical regularity is
broadly familiar in somewhatgeneral terms, although to date little if any
forinalanalysisof it has appeared.
Table 18 summarizes the main outlines of this regularity by showing
the respective quarterly average growth rates of federal government debt and
the remainder of domestic nonfinancial credit (including the debt of state and
local governments) duringthe six and one—half recognized business cycles
since1953. In part because of the lag of federal tax receipts behind
fluctuations in economic activity, but also in part because of the upward
seculartrend in the growth rate of federal debt outstanding (as budget
deficits have grown, while the level of federal debt outstanding has shrunk,
relative to nonfinancial economic activity), thebasic regularity of the
"creditcycle" is more uniformly descriptive of private than of public
borrowing.26 In four contractions out of six,average federal debt growth
wasfaster than in the preceding expansion, but the mean difference inTABLE 18
POST-WAR CYCLICAL MOVEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEBT
Average Growth Rate Average Growth Rate
Business Ojcles of Government Debt of Private Debt




























Meanfor All Contractions 5.69% 7.76%
Meanfor All Expansions 5.30% 9.80%
Note: Values shown are in pe.rcent per annum.—37—
growth rates between contractions and expansions has been less than 1/2%
per annum. By contrast, private debt growth in each expansion has been
faster than in the preceding contraction, while private debt growth in
eachcontraction has been slower than in the preceding expansion, resulting
in a mean growth rate in expansions fully 2% per annum greater than in
contractions.
Attemptsto analyze the dynamic aspects of these regularities using
the same time-domain results applied in Section IV yielded few interesting
results, but the corresponding frequency—domain results do bear inspection.
The top two panels of Figure 5 show the respective power spectra of
federal and private sectordebt growth, estimated using quarterly data for
1952:I-l982:IV. The spectrum for federal debt growth displays an obvious
spike at almost exactly the mean cyclical frequency of 1/3 radian, while
thatfor private debt growth exhibits a large spike at a frequency only
moderately higher. In contrast to the results reported in Section IV for
the growth of money and credit, the respective frequency—domain properties
of federal andprivatedebt growth do not exhibit significant differences.
In the range of .20—.79 radian, the value of the test statistic for the
null hypothesis of no difference between these two spectra is only .44
(distributed normally with 22 degrees of freedom), notsignificant at
anyreasonable level. The bottom two panels of Figure 5 show the respective
coherences of federal debt growth and private debt growth with real income
growth. Both show increases at about 1/3 radian, although the coherences
are smaller than those reported above for the growth of money and credit.
In the same range of .20— .79 radian, the coherence of real income growth


















































































































































































































coherence between private debt growth and real income growth is .77 with
standard error .09.
In addition to this evidence of regular comovements of federal and
private debt growth with real income growth at cyclical frequencies, the
associated phase relationships (corresponding to leads and lags in the
time domain) provide some support for the idea that private borrowing
activity helps in part to determine real incomewhilethe federal
government's budget posture reacts passively.27 Federal debt growth lags
real income growth by a phase angle of 1.47 radians (or 4.7 quarters)
with standard error .55, while private debt growth leads real income
growth by a phase angle of .97 radians (or 3.1 quarters) with a standard
error or .18. Despite the small standard errors,however, these apparent
differences are not statistically significant. The value of the test
statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference between the two
coherences in the same .20- .79 radian range is only .002 (distributed as
a t-statistic with 22 degrees of freedom).
Similarnegative results emerge from asking whether either federal
debt growth or private debt growth significantly contributes to explaining
the frequency-domain properties of real income growth in the presence of the
other.28 In the range of .20- .79 radian, the values of the test statistic
(distributed as an F-statistic with 2 and 20 degrees of freedom) for the
partial coherence of real income growth with federal debt growth andwith
private debt growth —ineach case taking the other as given —are
respectively 1.49 and .17. Neither is significant at the .10 level.
Insum, there is evidence of a "credit cycle" in the senseof regular
movementsof federal and private sector debt growth, and regular comovements—39—
of each with real incomegrowth,at cyclical frequencies. In addition,
there is some indication that private debt growth leads real income
growth while federal debt growth lags, but the differences between
these respective comovements are not statistically significant, nor does
either federal or private debt growth contain significant information
about real income growth beyond what is also in the other.—40—
VI. Surnrnaf_Conclusions
Therecan be no doubt that economic fluctuations in the United
States have their monetary and financial side. The comovements among
money, credit,interest rates and nonfinancial economic activity are
evident enough at the crudest eyeball level of inspection, as well as
in the results of sore sophisticated time— and frequency—domain exercises.
Moreover, many of these comoveitents have coincided with major historical
business cycle episodes.
On closer inspection, however, these monetary and financial aspects
ofU.S.economic fluctuations exhibit few quantitative regularities
thathave persisted unchanged across spans of time in which the nation's
financial markets have undergone profound and far reaching changes.
The evidence for the absence of such persistent quantitative regularities
assembled in this paper shows major differences among the pre World
WarI, inter—war, and post World War II periods, and between the first
and second halves of the post—war period. Evidence suggesting changes
from one period to another repeatedly emerges, regardless of whether
the method of analysis is simple or sophisticated, regardless of whether
the underlying data are annual or quarterly, and regardless of whether
the relationships under study are bivariate or multivariate. Moreover,
the differences between one period and another reported here are significant
not just statistically but economically as well, in the sense of major
differences in the magnitude and timing of cyclical comovements.
The paper's main message, therefore, is a warning against accepting
too readily —eitheras a matter of positive economics or for policy
purposes —theappearance of simple and eternal verities in much of the—41—
existing literature of monetary and financial aspects of business fluctuations.
More complicated models involving many variables and/ornonlinear
relationships may have remained stable, but the evidence clearly shows that
simple linear relationships among only a few such variables havenot.Footnotes
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1.Stock prices have also attracted substantial attention in a business
cycle context, but less so than has been the case for money, credit
and interest rates.
2.See, for example, de Leeuw and Gramlich (1968, 1969), Pndo (1974) ,and
Modigliani and 2ndo (1976).
3. See, for example, Anderson and Jordan (1968) and Anderson and Carison
(1970) .Thesemodels are really reduced—form in spirit, however.
See Jonson (1976) for an example of an attempt at a more structural
rendering of the same ideas.
4. Empirical work to date among these lines has mostly adopted a
reduced—formapproach. See, for example, KingandPlosser (1981)
5. Much earlier on the Bank of the United States had constituted a
rudimentary form of central bank, but itpassed out ofexistence when
AndrewJackson declined to renew its charter in 1832.From then until
thepassage of the National Banking Act in 1864, private commercial
banks were chartered exclusively by the individual states. Thereafter,
until 1914, federally chartered banks enjoyed a monopoly over the
note—issuing power but continued (as they do today) to share other
bankingfunctions, like deposit taking, with state chartered banks.6. The discussion that follows focuses narrowly on the financial
markets and therefore omits such important elements of the changing
roleof government as taxes, government spending, bankruptcy
arrangennts, and so on —allof which could importantly affect the
relationships between monetary and financial variables and levels of
economic activity.
7. The underying data are annual averages centered on June 30. From
1890 to 1907 the annual data are averages of quarterly figures.
From 1908 to 1945 they are averages of end-of-month data. From
1947 to 1975 they are averages of daily—average monthly data.
8. The underlying data, constructed for this paper, are annual
averages of monthly data, including end—of—month data through
1946 and daily-average data since 1947.(The Federal Peserve has
constructed the official new Ml series back only to 1959.)
9. The underlying data are end—of—year data. The domestic nonfinancial
credit concept is roughly analogous to 8primarysecurities"in the
sense of Gurley and Shaw (1960).
10. Thedata are annual averages of daily—average monthly data.
11. The expansion ending in 1948:IV officially began in 1945:IV, but
the analysis here and below excludes itso asto avoid any remaining
effects due to the wartime economy.
12.The table excludes credit growth for the first contraction and
expansionbecause quarterly credit data are available only from
1952:1onward.
13. It is at first tempting to suggest that, given the upward secular
trend, the lower average levels for expansions are simply due to theomission ofthe expansion that began in 1982:IV; but any such
claim would,of course, be merely a forecast.
14.From 1929 to 1982 the underlying GNP data are the standard National
Income and Product Accounts estimates. From 1909 to 1928 the data are
U.S. Department of Commerce estimates which (in principle) are
analogous to the subsequent N.I.P.A. estimates at the aggregate level.
From 1890 to 1908 the data are Department of Commerce estimates based
t-rn (1Q1
15.In addition, because the underlying variables are serially correlated,
the conventional statistical confidence levels indicated in Table 3
areoverstated.
16. See Cramer (1983), for example, for evidence on the different respective
movements of income and total transactions.
17.The reason for calculating the relationships among the nonfinancial
variablesa second time in the lower half of the table is that
quarterly credit data are not available for the first post—war
contraction and expansion. The same point applies to Table 7 below.
18. Theunderlying vector autoregressions include a constant term and
and twolagson each variable in each equation. The results for
analogous autoregressions also including a linear time trend are
broadly similar. (The most interesting difference to emerge on the
introduction of a time trend is that Ml no longer helps explain
nominal income.) Io lags appear to be sufficient to eliminate most,
if not all, of the serial correlation in the residuals of the
equations based on these annual data. Because each equation includes
lags on both variables, and therefore a rational distributed lag,there is of courseno limitation on the length of lag in the economic
processrepresented.
19. The underlying vector autoregression systems include a constant term
and four lags on each variable in each equation.(The discussion
of lag length in footnote 18 applies here too.) Once again, the
results for analogous autoregressions also including a linear time
trend are broadly similar.
20. In this system the most interesting difference to appear on the
introduction of a time trend is that the one variable which
helps explain real income growth is not money growth but the change
in short—term interest rates.
21. In this system real growth in turn helps explain money growth but not
credit growth.
22. In this system real growth in turn helps explain money growth but not
credit growth nor the interest rate change.
23. This exercise relies on data for the full post—war period, despite the
time—domainevidence of structural change within that period, soas
to provide enough observations to make the frequency—domain analysis
sensible. Both spectra, as well as the coherences displayed below,
were estimated using a triangular window with bandwidth 11..
24.I am grateful to Jim Powell for assistance in constructing the
tests,and for calculating the test statistics and their
distributions, reported here and in Section VI below.
25. With the estimated coherences so close to unity, the calculated
standard errors are not well behaved.
26. See Friedman (1983b) for a discussion of the divergent trends in
federal deficits and federal debt outstanding in relation to economic
activity.27. This ideaisconsistent with a cyclical role for "credit crunches.
It is also consistent with the fact that only some one—fourth
of the cumulative federal budget deficit incurred during the
period under study here would have emerged if the economy had
remained at "high employment" throughout; see again, for example,
Friedman (l983b).
28. The lack of significance here parallels the results of time—domain
exogeneity tests.Be fere nces
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